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The social psychology of movement participation is concerned with the question as to why people participate in social movements. As social psychology explores the causes of the thoughts, feelings and actions of people – and primarily how these are influenced by social context – it has a lot to offer to the study of movement participation.

INDIVIDUALS IN MOVEMENTS

Over the years grievances, efficacy, identity, emotions, and social embeddedness have been proposed to explain movement participation.

Grievances

Grievances are at the heart of movement participation, be it moral indignation about some state of affairs, or a suddenly imposed grievance, feelings of relative deprivation, feelings of injustice, or the experience of illegitimate inequality (Klandermans 1997). Suddenly imposed grievances refer to an unexpected threat upon people's rights or circumstances (Walsh 1981). Moral outrage results when important values or principles are violated. Illegitimate inequality is what relative deprivation and social justice theories are about.

Feelings of relative deprivation result from comparison of one's situation with a standard – be it one's past, someone else's situation, or a cognitive standard such as equity or justice (Folger 1986). Relative deprivation based on personal comparisons is referred to as egoistic deprivation and relative deprivation based on group comparisons as fraternalistic deprivation (Runciman 1966). Fraternalistic deprivation is particularly important for engagement in protest (Major 1994), while the combination of egoistic deprivation *and* fraternalistic deprivation is the strongest predictor of protest (Foster & Matheson 1999). Moreover, the affective component – feelings as dissatisfaction and indignation about outcomes – has more influence on movement participation than the cognitive component – the observation that one receives less than the standard of comparison (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears 2008).

Feelings Social justice theory explains how feelings of injustice translate into protest (Tyler & Smith 1998). Two classes of justice judgments are distinguished: distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice approximates relative deprivation; it refers to the fairness of outcomes. Procedural justice refers to the fairness of procedures (being treated with respect, dignity; Tyler & Smith 1998). People care more about procedures than about outcomes. Therefore Tyler and Smith propose procedural justice to be a more powerful predictor of movement participation than distributive justice.

Efficacy

Because grievances are ubiquitous whereas protest is not, social movement scholars began to question the effects of grievances on movement participation. The social psychological answer to this insight is efficacy. Efficacy refers to the individual's expectation that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through protest (Gamson 1992). The relationship is straightforward: the more effective an individual believes protest participation is, the more likely she or he is to participate. Mummendey and colleagues (1999) propose that group rather than personal efficacy predicts protest participation. Furthermore, Klandermans (1997) shows that people are more likely to participate in movement activities when they believe this will help to

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redress their grievances at affordable costs. Efficacious and inefficacious people take different routes to social change though: while normative forms of protest like petitioning and demonstrations tends to attract highly efficacious people, non-normative forms of protest are more likely to attract less highly efficacious people.

Identity

The more people identify with a group the more they are inclined to protest on behalf of that group (Reicher 1984; Simon et al. 1998; Stryker, Owens, & White 2000; Simon & Klandermans 2001). Why is group identification such a powerful motivational push to movement participation? First of all, identification with others is accompanied by an awareness of similarity and shared fate with those who belong to the same category. Furthermore, the "strength" of an identity comes from its affective component; the more "the group is in me" the more "I feel for us" (Yzerbyt et al. 2003) and the more strongly I am motivated to participate on behalf of the group. Collective identification, especially the more politicized form of it, intensifies feelings of efficacy (see Simon et al. 1998; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears 2008). Next to shared fate, shared emotions, and enhanced efficaciousness, identification with others involved generates a felt inner obligation to behave as a "good" group member (Stürmer et al. 2003). When self-definition changes from personal to social identity, the group norm of participation becomes salient; the more one identifies with the group, the more weight this group norm will carry and the more it will result in an "inner obligation" to participate on behalf of the group. Together these dynamics explain why group identification functions as a "stepping stone" to politicization.

Emotions

Anger is seen as *the* prototypical protest emotion (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2007). Anger moves people to adopt a more challenging relationship with authorities than subordinate emotions such as shame or despair. Van Zomeren et al. (2004) show that group-based anger is an important motivator of protest participation. There exists a relation to efficacy: People who perceive the ingroup as strong are more likely to experience anger and desire to take action; people who perceive the ingroup as weak are more likely to feel fearful and to move away from the outgroup (Devos, Silver, & Mackie 2002; Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg 2008). In explaining different tactics, efficacy appears to be relevant too. Group-based anger is mainly observed in normative actions where efficacious people protest. However, in non-normative violent actions contempt appears to be the more relevant emotion (Fischer & Roseman 2007). This suggests two emotional routes to protest: an anger route based on efficacy leading to normative action and a contempt route as the situation is seen as hopeless invoking a "nothing to lose" strategy leading to non-normative protest (Kamans, Otten, & Gordijn 2011).

Group-based appraisal theories of emotions have introduced emotions to the social psychology of movement participation (see Van Zomeren et al. 2004). Appraisal theory of emotion conceives appraisal, emotion and action as the means by which people perceive and cope with events in their social world. Hence, two persons can appraise the same event differently and have different emotional responses. Appraisal theory was developed to explain personal emotions experienced by individuals. Yet, Smith (1993) extrapolated personal appraisals to group-based appraisal with the main postulate that people can experience emotions based on their group membership, thus "I" feel for "us" (Yzerbyt et al. 2003).

Social embeddedness

Social embeddedness plays a pivotal role in the context of protest. Networks provide space for the creation and dissemination of discourse critical of authorities, and it provides a way for active opposition to these authorities to grow (Paxton 2002). Discursive processes take place to form a consensus that makes



up the symbolic resources in collective sense-making (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997). The more political discussion occurs in social networks, the more people are able to gather information and the more they will participate in politics (McClurg 2003). Klandermans, Van der Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg (2008) provide evidence for such mechanisms, immigrants who felt efficacious were more likely to participate in protest provided that they were embedded in social networks, which offer an opportunity to discuss and learn about politics. People are informed of upcoming events and social capital as trust and loyalty accumulate in networks to provide individuals with the resources needed to invest in protest (Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg 2008). In their networks people talk politics by which the factuality of the sociopolitical world is constructed and people are mobilized for protest.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES

In providing answers to the question of why people participate in movements, we separately discussed grievances, efficacy, identity, emotions and social embeddedness, but obviously in practice all these concepts are interwoven. And this is precisely the focus of contemporary social psychological approaches: combined, multiple pathways to movement participation.

Simon and colleagues (1998) were the first to propose a *dual path model* to protest participation in which they distinguished between an instrumental pathway – in which efficacy figured prominently – and an identity pathway guided by processes of identification. Rather than replacing instrumentality as an explanatory paradigm, identification added to the explanation as a second pathway. Van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) also propose a dual path model, comprising an efficacy and emotion path. The importance of emotions as motivators is shown, again without replacing the instrumental pathway. Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk (2009) combined grievances, efficacy, identity, and emotions. This model assigns a central, integrating role to processes of identification (van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van Dijk 2009). In order to develop the shared grievances and shared emotions a shared identity is needed (see figure).

The more people feel that interests of the group and/or principles that the group values are threatened, the angrier they are and the more they are prepared to take part in protest to protect their interests and principles and/or to express their anger. These pathways are meta-analytically confirmed and modeled in the so-called Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears 2008).

The next step for the social psychology of movement participation will be to theorize on when people take what pathway and why. Yet, compared to 25 years ago, the social psychology of movement participation has become richer,

more sophisticated, and as such has a lot to offer to the study of movement participation.

SEE ALSO: Collective efficacy; Collective identity; Commitment; Emotion and social movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Networks and social movements; Participation in social movements; Politicized identity; Relative deprivation; Social and solidary incentives.

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